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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent/Appellee, 
v. 
RAYMOND PHILLIP CABUTUTAN 
Petitioner/Appellant. 
Case No. 900289 
Priority No. 2 
APPELLEE'S ANSWER TO PETITION FOR REHEARING 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THIS COURT DID NOT OVERLOOK OR MISAPPREHEND 
ANY POINT OF LAW OR FACT RAISED BY PETITIONER 
IN HIS OPENING BRIEF. FURTHERMORE, POINTS 
NOW RAISED BY PETITIONER ARE NOT AMENABLE TO 
CONSIDERATION ON REHEARING; RATHER, THEY ARE 
MORE PROPERLY ADDRESSED IN A PETITION FOR 
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS. 
Introduction 
In his opening brief petitioner's counsel asserted 
trial court errors which, he claimed, adversely affected his 
representation (Appellant's Br. at Petitioner seeks in this 
petition to resurrect claims made by his former defense counsel 
on appeal, there solicitously characterized as instances of 
ineffective assistance of counsel at trial but which this Court 
correctly recognized as genuine assertions of trial error 
A. This Court did not Misapprehend 
or Overlook Anything in Reviewing 
Petitioner's Appeal. 
Rule 35, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, provides 
that in support of a petition for rehearing the petitioner must 
identify "the points of law or fact which the petitioner claims 
the court has overlooked or misapprehended . . . ." Utah R. App. 
P. 35(a). Cummings v. Neilson, 42 Utah 157, 172-73, 129 P.619 
(1913) . 
1. Petitioner's Appellate Counsel 
was Plainly Asserting Trial Court 
Error as Opposed to Ineffective 
Assistance of Counsel. 
In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 
2052 (1984), the United States Supreme Court set out the standard 
to be applied in reviewing claims of ineffective assistance of 
counsel: 
First, the defendant must show that counsel's 
performance was deficient. This requires showing 
that counsel was not functioning as the "counsel" 
guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. 
Second, the defendant must show that the 
deficient performance prejudiced the defense. 
This requires showing that counsel's errors were 
so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair 
trial, a trial whose result is reliable. 
Id. at 2064-68 (emphasis added). 
Petitioner was represented at trial by Quinn Hunsaker, 
who also represented petitioner on appeal. As petitioner 
correctly points out, this arrangement poses inherent 
difficulties for counsel who seeks to argue on appeal his own 
ineffectiveness at trial. See Dunn v. Cook. 791 P.2d 873, 876 
(Utah 1990) (stating, in dicta, that counsel on appeal could not 
effectively challenge his own trial performance). However, this 
is not such a case. 
Mr. Hunsaker identified five areas at trial in which he 
facially asserted that he did not function as effective counsel 
(Appellant's Br. at 19, 39-43). However, it is apparent from 
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petitioner's opening brief, as it is from this Court's decision, 
State v. Cabututan, 213 Utah Adv. Rep. 18 (Utah 1993) (attached 
at Addendum A), that Mr. Hunsaker was not arguing his own 
ineffectiveness, but rather trial court error. 
Particularly, Mr. Hunsaker alleged that he was unable 
to: (1) adequately cross-examine witness; (2) object to the jury 
panel or insure that minorities were on the panel; (3) determine 
whether to sever from or join with co-defendants at trial; (4) 
investigate alcohol/intent claims by a psychiatrist; or (5) 
adequately prepare the self-defense argument (Appellant's Br. at 
43) -1 
However, with respect to each of these claims, 
petitioner specifically and vigorously argued that it trial court 
error that led to these alleged shortcomings. Thus, petitioner's 
alleged failure to adequately cross examine witnesses was 
substantively argued as a function of the trial court's refusal 
to provide petitioner with an investigator (Appellant's Br. at 
23-24) . Petitioner argued the same ground with respect to his 
alleged failure to prepare a self-defense argument (Appellant's 
Br. at 22, 25). Petitioner directed a separate section of his 
brief to the argument that he had been deprived of the 
opportunity to investigate alcohol/intent claims, arguing state 
and federal constitutional violations and Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-
1
 This itemization of alleged ineffectiveness consists of 
the same items which petitioner claims Mr. Hunsaker could not 
have effectively argued in petitioner's motion for new trial 
(Petition at 9-10). 
3 
1 (1990), all supported with citation to legal authority 
(Appellant's Br. at 24-28). All of these claims, including the 
determination of whether to proceed with separate or joint 
trials, were explicitly stated as a function of the limited time 
within which petitioner claimed he had been constrained to 
prepare (Appellant's Br. at 42). However, petitioner's challenge 
to the trial court's refusal to grant him a continuance was the 
primary argument advanced by petitioner on appeal, embracing all 
others (Appellant's Br. at 19-28). 
At no point did Mr. Hunsaker truly acknowledge that he 
believed he had functioned incompetently. Furthermore, this 
Court determined there was no trial court error with respect to 
each of the substantive grounds purportedly forming the basis of 
Mr. Hunsaker's alleged ineffectiveness. Compare Cabututan, 213 
P.2d at 19-21 (holding defense counsel, appointed two and one-
half months before trial, had sufficient time and access to an 
investigator to prepare), with Hintz v. Beto, 379 F.2d 937, 942-
43 (5th Cir. 1967) (failure to grant motion to continue, thus 
restricting time available to counsel to develop defense relying 
on psychiatric evaluation, rendered counsel ineffective). In 
sum, this Court should not in a petition for rehearing revisit 
arguments that have already been substantively addressed. People 
v. Tidwell, 5 Utah 88, 12 P. 638 (Utah 1886); Brown v. Pickard, 4 
Utah 292, 9 P. 573 (Utah 1886). 
Only with respect to petitioner's claim that he failed 
to object to the jury panel or insure that minorities were 
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included on the panel did Mr. Hunsaker choose not to argue 
substantively. As the State pointed out, Mr. Hunsaker obviously 
concluded that the claims of racial bias upon which the argument 
was based were without merit (Appellee's Brief at 32-33). This 
assertion is buttressed by petitioner's having made this claim 
the basis of his argument under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 
738, 87 S. Ct. 1396 (1967) (Appellant's Br. at 45-46). 
Petitioner, however, is not concerned with any failure 
to fully develop an Anders brief on a single issue. Rather, his 
discussion recites a series of alleged omissions, argued by the 
State in its opening brief, which suggest to petitioner that Mr. 
Hunsaker's appellate brief was intended entirely as an Anders 
brief (Petition at 11-12). As argued above, and as also pointed 
out by the State (Appellee's Br. at 32-33), Mr. Hunsaker argued 
vigorously a substantial number of issues, though not all of 
which compelled counsel's serious attention. It is apparent that 
this Court recognized this, finding simply that claims of juror 
bias were unsupported by legal authority. 
2. No Conflict of Interest is 
Shown to Have Affected Trial 
Counsel's Representation. 
In support of his claim that Mr. Hunsaker was burdened 
by a conflict of interest in his representation, petitioner cites 
cases in which prejudice is latent because of the nature of a 
conflict which is manifest in the representation. See State v. 
Johnson, 823 P.2d 484, 488-90 (Utah App. 1991) (defense counsel 
was implicated at trial as one of the defendant's 
5 
coconspirators); State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 857-58 (Utah 1992) 
(part-time city prosecutor representing criminal defendant 
constituted an inherent conflict of interest since counsel might 
naturally refrain from vigorously cross-examining or attacking 
police officers or opposing the constitutionality of a statute 
prosecutor was sworn to uphold, in addition to possibly being 
affected by unconscious impulses). 
The burden of showing the existence of an actual 
conflict of interest is the proponent of an ineffective 
assistance claim. State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 73 (Utah App. 
1990) (applying test set out in Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 
348, 100 S. Ct. 1708, 1718 (1980), when the defendant has not 
raised in the trial court an ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim based on a conflict of interest). 
In this case the alleged conflict of interest is based 
on Cabututan v. Hunsaker, No. 92-C-136 J (D.C. Utah 1992) (see 
Addendum attached to Petition). The complaint alleges claims 
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983 1985(3) and 1986. The claims 
urged are substantially those allegations comprising petitioner's 
claims of ineffective assistance.2 The district court's 
2
 The Tenth Circuit glossed petitioner's claimed violations 
of his constitutional rights: 
"Among the appellants [sic] claims are that 
the appellee failed to request a venue change 
in light of pretrial publicity, request a new 
jury after he was informed of prejudicial 
remarks made by some jurors, impeach or 
object to the testimony of contradictory 
eyewitnesses, object to violations of the 
exclusionary rule, keep out perjured 
6 
docketing sheet indicates that the complaint was filed on 
February 12, 1992 (see Addendum attached to Petition), more than 
six months after the case was argued before this Court on June 
10, 1991. The Tenth Circuit dismissed the claims under sections 
1981, 1985(3) and 1986, noting that "[n]one of these [racial] 
references suggest that the appellee acted with any racial or 
class-based discriminatory animus." Cabututan v. Hunsaker, No. 
92-4086 at 3-4 n.6. Thus, the conflict petitioner refers to 
amounts to nothing more than his claims of ineffective 
assistance, which Mr. Hunsaker could not even have been aware of 
until more than half a year after he effectively ceased any 
active representation of petitioner. 
Finally, petitioner's affidavit, in conjunction with 
the trial court's acceptance of petitioner's request to represent 
himself on appeal (see Affidavit of Raymond Phillip Cabututan and 
Minute Entry of July 11, 1990, attached to Addendum to Petition), 
only suggests a disagreement between attorney and client at time 
of the events referred to. It is indisputable that after the 
trial court accepted petitioner's request for self-representation 
he acquiesced in Mr. Hunsaker's proceeding with the appeal. 
testimony, move for a racially balanced jury, 
or more for a new trial. In addition, the 
appellant claim the appellee was "related 
through marriage" to the state's [sic] 
attorney, represented some of the jurors as a 
private attorney, refuse to argue self-
defense as the appellant request and 
incompetently directed his appeal. 
Cabututan v. Hunsaker, No. 92-4086, slip op. at 2 n.2 (10th Cir. 
March 1, 1993) . 
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There is nothing in the record to suggest that such acquiescence 
was not entirely voluntary, the rational inference in this case. 
In any event, this Court could not have "overlooked or 
misapprehended" an alleged conflict of interest which was not 
explicitly brought to its attention. 
B. Petitioner's Claims are Properly 
Addressed Only in a Petition for 
Writ of Habeas Corpus. 
Rule 65B, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides: 
"Where no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy is available, a 
person may petition the court for extraordinary relief on any of 
the grounds set forth in paragraph (b) (involving wrongful 
imprisonment) . . . ." Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(a). Because 
rehearing and, as argued below, remand pursuant to rule 23B, Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, do not provide a plain, speedy and 
adequate remedy, petitioner should be directed to file a petition 
for writ of habeas corpus under rule 65B. 
Even if this Court should determine that the issue of 
trial counsel's arguing his ineffectiveness on appeal was an 
issue that was overlooked, that is not an issue which this Court 
can resolve on a petition for rehearing. Assuming, arguendo, 
that trial counsel cannot argue his own ineffectiveness on 
appeal, there is not a sufficient record upon which any 
particulars of deficient performance or prejudice can be 
determined under Strickland and State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 
1225 (Utah 1993) (citing Strickland for the standard in 
evaluating a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel). It is 
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apparent that petitioner's claims, i.e., that the jury was 
racially prejudiced or that Mr. Hunsaker was unable to assess 
whether or not to proceed jointly with co-defendants, cannot be 
determined on the record presently before the Court. 
This Court has echoed the above-stated principle that a 
defendant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must 
demonstrate actual prejudice flowing from the alleged error, and 
not some conceivable adverse effect on the verdict. Bundy v. 
Deland, 763 P.2d 803, 805-6 (Utah 1988); Codianna v. Morris, 660 
P.2d 1101, 1107 (Utah 1983); State v. Lovell, 758 P.2d 909, 913 
(Utah 1988); State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986). 
Further, this Court has made clear that an assessment of 
ineffective assistance of counsel, whether for determining the 
adequacy of the lawyer's performance or the existence of actual 
prejudice, must be made within the context of the entire record. 
Codianna, 660 P.2d at 1107; State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 187 
(Utah 1990). 
Petitioner in this case has merely made a suggestive 
argument that his trial counsel was not in a position to 
represent him on appeal, but has failed to place before this 
Court a record upon which his claims could be assessed. State v. 
Noren, 704 P.2d 568, 571 (Utah 1985) ("The burden of showing 
error is on the party who seeks to upset the judgment.") (quoting 
State v. Jones, 657 P.2d 1263, 1267 (Utah 1982). 
In Dunn v. Cook, this Court recognized the deficiency 
of the defendant's Anders brief only after he had developed a 
record in the district court following the denial of his petition 
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for writ of habeas corpus. Dunn, 791 P.2d at 877. 
Further evidence of the inadequacy of a petition for 
rehearing to adequately address issues which can only be resolved 
after further development of the record is recourse to rule 23B, 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. That rule provides for a 
temporary remand to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing to 
determine prejudice arising out of a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel supported by affidavits showing the 
attorney's deficient performance and the appellant's having 
suffered prejudice. Utah R. App. P. 23B. However, the rule 
limits the period in which it may be invoked: "In no event shall 
the court permit a motion to be filed after oral argument." Utah 
R. App. P. 23B(a). Thus, only a petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus, in which the necessary evidentiary record can be 
developed, is available. 
Furthermore, it would be both awkward for this Court 
and unfair to the State to grant rehearing in this case. In the 
first instance, the Court's opinion in Cabututan would remain in 
limbo while awaiting the development of a record (assuming this 
Court were willing to suspend the filing requirements of rule 
23B, pursuant to rule 2, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure). In 
the second instance, the State could not adequately respond 
within the framework of a petition for rehearing on the merits of 
petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Mr. 
Hunsaker is dead, and therefore cannot assist the State in 
explaining his trial conduct. In order to defend the adequacy of 
10 
Mr. Hunsaker's representation, in addition to whatever record 
support may exist, the State must necessarily obtain personal 
records, memos and third-party conversations, if any exist. This 
is necessarily a time-consuming investigation. Thus, for all 
these reasons, this Court should decline to grant rehearing. 
POINT II 
PETITIONER MAY FULLY LITIGATE CLAIMS RELATED 
TO INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL UPON A 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS, IF THE 
COURT FINDS PETITIONER HAS ESTABLISHED 
"UNUSUAL CIRCUMSTANCES." 
Petitioner is generally correct in asserting that 
claims once litigated cannot be relitigated. In construing rule 
65B(i) (2), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,3 this Court stated in 
Hurst v. Cook, 777 P.2d 1029 (Utah 1989): 
A ground for relief from a conviction or 
sentence that has once been fully and fairly 
adjudicated on appeal or in a prior habeas 
proceeding should not be readjudicated unless 
it can be shown that there are "unusual 
circumstances." 
In Dunn v. Cook, this Court recognized that in a proper case a 
defendant could show "unusual circumstances" by demonstrating 
that he had been denied effective assistance of counsel. Dunn at 
875-76. Therefore, petitioner in this case is not foreclosed 
from proceeding upon a petition for writ of habeas corpus if he 
can indeed show that there existed unusual circumstances 
amounting to a denial of constitutional rights. 
3
 In 1992, the rule was amended and substantially 
reorganized. Equivalent provisions now appear at subsections 
(b) (3) and (b) (7) . 
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POINT III 
PETITIONER MAY NOT RAISE ISSUES OTHER THAN 
THOSE MANDATED BY THIS COURT IN ITS REMAND 
ORDER. 
Petitioner apparently argues that he be permitted to 
raise whatever issues he chooses upon remand of this case to the 
trial court. The argument is without merit. 
In Cabututan, this Court reversed the trial court's 
denial of petitioner's motion for a new trial and remanded the 
case for a new hearing based on the availability of the 
transcripts of co-defendants trials. Cabututan, 213 Utah Adv. 
Rep. at 21-22. The remand was ordered for no other purpose and 
should be appropriately restricted to the mandate of this Court 
in so ruling. See State v. Magouirk, 561 So.2d 801, 806-07 (La. 
Ct. App. 1990) (remand for limited purpose of conducting 
evidentiary hearing on one issue and defendant no entitled to 
have motion to quash indictment based on alleged prosecutorial 
misconduct heard prior to remand). Further, defendant's request 
is unsupported by any legal authority. State v. Amicone, 689 
P.2d 1341, 1344, (Utah 1984) ("Since the defendant fails to 
support this argument by any legal analysis or authority, we 
decline to rule on it,") 
In sum, this Court's remand for a hearing based on the 
use of transcripts of co-defendant's trials should be limited for 
purpose of determining exculpatory testimony and the substance of 
petitioner's claim of self-defense, as set forth in the Court's 
remand order. Cabututan, 213 Utah Adv. Rep. at 22. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing reasons, the State 
respectfully requests that this Court deny petitioner's petition 
for a rehearing. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this J__ day of November, 1993. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General.^ 
KENNETH A. BRONSTON 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the 
foregoing Answer to Petition for Rehearing was mailed, postage 
prepaid to A. W. Lauritzen, Attorney for Defendant, 610 North 
Main, P.O. Box 171, Logan, Utah 84321, this /_ day of November, 
1993 7
^A 
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ADDENDUM A 
18 State v. Cabututan 213Ut*Adv leg IS Code«Co Provo \Juh 
UAPA "clearly indicates that absent a grant of 
discretion, a correcuon-of-errorsundard is used 
m reviewing an agency's interpretation or 
application of a statutory term "5 However, we 
further observed that where we might otherwise 
grant an agency deference on the basis of its 
expertise, "it is also appropriate to grant the 
agency deference on the basis of an explicit or 
implicit grant of discretion contained in the 
governing statute."6 This case presents such a 
circumstance. 
The Commission correctly observed that it lies 
within die authority, indeed, it is the duty and 
obligation, of county boards of equalization to 
adjust and equalize the valuation and assessment 
of all property within the county.7 The 
assessments made by the county assessor,* as 
equalized by the county board of equalization 
and the Commission, are the only basis for 
property taxation by the county.9 
The record adequately supports the 
reasonableness of the Commission's conclusion 
as to the insufficiency of the evidence offered by 
both sides concerning the fair market value of 
the property The record dispels any notion of 
arbitrariness or capaciousness in the 
Commission's exercise of its discretion to 
remand for a further evidentiary hearing before 
the Board. Also, so prejudice results by reason 
of the remand. On the contrary, it will afford 
each party the opportunity to more adequately 
present the needed evidence of fair market 
value 
In regard to the remaining contention that 
further proceedings before the Board will be to 
no avail, suffice it to say that the various county 
assessors and boards of equalization throughout 
the state cannot but be faced with similarly 
difficult evaluation tasks, and no doubt, there 
are many and varied means to accomplish their 
mandated task, which is to determine fair market 
value of all property within the state In any 
event,the contention does not rise to the level of 
a constitutional question. 
We have duly considered petitioners' 
remaining contentions and find diem to be 
without ment We therefore affirm the orders of 
the Commission. 
WE CONCUR: 
Richard C. Howe, Associate Chief Justice 
I. Daniel Stewart, Justice 
Christine M. Durham, Justice 
Michael D. Zimmerman, Justice 
1. Utah Code Ann |63-46b-16 
2. 814? 2d 581 (Utah 1991) 
3. Id at 585-87 
4. Id x 584 
5. Id 1588 
t.ld 
7. Utah Code Ann §59-2-1001(2) 
8. Utah Code Ann §59-2-301 states, "The county 
assessor shall assess all property located within the 
county which is not required by law to be assessed by 
the commission " 
». Utah Code Ann 159-2-302 
C i t e * 
213 Utah Adv. Rep. 18 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
?. 
Raymond Phillip CABUTUTAN, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 900289 
FILED: May 24, 1993 
First District, Box Elder County 
The Honorable Franklin L. Gunnel! 
ATTORNEYS: 
R. Paul Van Dam, Att'y Gen., Judith S. H 
Atherton, Asst Att'y Gen , Salt Lake City, 
for plaintiff 
A W. Launtzen, Logan, for defendant 
This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
HOWE, Associate Chief Justice: 
Defendant Raymond Phillip Cabututan was 
one of four defendants convicted of second 
degree murder in the beating death of Miguel 
Ramirez, m violation of Utah Code Ann 
§76*5-203. He was also convicted of aggravated 
assault, in violation of section 76-5-103, and of 
a related misdemeanor. All four defendants were 
convicted in separate trials, and all four 
appealed Their appeals have been separately 
considered, two by this court and two by the 
court of appeals. See State v. Brown, P 2d 
(Utah 1992); State v. Cunvmns, 839 P.2d 
848 (Utah Ct. App 1992), State v. Coyer, 814 
P.2d 604 (Utah Ct. App 1991). 
FACTS 
The incident that resulted m the death of 
Ramirez occurred on October 25, 1989, at a 
small trailer camp commonly known as 
"Fingerpoint.* The camp is located on a remote 
site on the Great Salt Lake's northwest shore 
The four trailers m the camp were owned by 
Western Brine Shrimp Company, which 
employed the four defendants and four other 
workers who witnessed the beating. The evening 
of the incident was a dark, cloudy, moonless 
night; the only outside lights for miles around 
the camp were the dim lights of the trailers. The 
violence began sometime between 9 p.m. and 
midnight as ^Htutan and co-defendants 
William Cummins, Donald Brown, and Billy 
Cayer were sitting in one of the trailers drinking 
alcohol. Eddie Apodaca, another worker at the 
camp, came to the trader. Cabututan and 
Apodaca began to argue, and Cabututan struck 
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Apodaca with a wrench. Apodaca then returned 
to his trailer and told roommate Miguel Ramirez 
what had happened. 
Minutes later, Brown, Cummins, Caver, and 
Cabututan entered Apodaca and Ramirez's 
trailer. More fighting occurred, knives were 
drawn, and Ramirez left the trailer. The three 
co-defendants followed him outside. Cabututan 
came out later. The fight escalated, and Brown, 
Cummins, Cayer, and for at least part of the 
time, Cabututan attacked Ramirez with 
nunchakus, knives, and a wrench. They also 
kicked him as he lay on the ground. At 
approximately 5 a.m. the following day, he died 
of multiple blunt trauma injury. 
The four defendants were arraigned in the 
district court on January 2, 1990, and the next 
day, separate trial dates were set. Cabututan's 
trial was scheduled to begin on January 22. On 
January 16, six days before his trial, he filed a 
notice of intent 'to offer testimony of a mental 
health expert to establish mental state" under 
Utah Code Ann. §77-14-3. He also moved as an 
indigent under section 77-32-1(3) and Utah Rule 
of Evidence 706 for the appointment of a 
psychiatrist and for a mental evaluation under 
section 77-14-4, all in support of a voluntary 
intoxication defense he intended to raise. The 
court held that notice of intent to offer such 
expert testimony had not been timely filed and 
on that basis denied all the motions. 
At trial, Cabututan contended that he did not 
participate in the prolonged beating of Ramirez. 
Instead, he maintained that be hit Ramirez with 
a wrench in self-defense when Ramirez attacked 
him with a knife. Cabututan testified that he 
took the knife away from Ramirez and went 
back to his trailer, where he had another drink 
and then went to sleep. Cabututan raised the 
defenses of self-defense and diminished capacity 
based on voluntary intoxication. He testified that 
he was intoxicated, as did other eyewitnesses, 
and a jury instruction on voluntary intoxication 
was given. Following his convictions, he moved 
for a new trial, but the court denied that motion. 
APPOINTMENT OF A PSYCHIATRIST 
Cabututan contends that the trud court erred in 
denying his motions because (1) the notice filed 
on January 16 was timely, and (2) as an 
indigent, he had a due process right to 
psychiatric assistance in preparing his voluntary 
intoxication defense, relying on Ake v. 
Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68,105 S. Ct. 1087, 84 L. 
Ed. 2d 53 (1985). Section 77-14-3(1) provides: 
When a defendant proposes to offer . . . 
testimony of a mental health expert to 
establish mental state, he shall, at the time 
of arraignment or as soon afterward as 
practicable, but not fewer than 30 days 
before his trial, file and serve the 
prosecuting attorney with written notice of 
his intention to claim the defense. 
Cabututan argues that the notice was timely filed 
under the circumstances since he was arraigned 
on January 2 and his trial was scheduled for 
January 22, just twenty days later, making it 
impossible for him to meet the thirty-day 
requirement in the statute. However, the trial 
court waived the thirty-day requirement, finding 
simply that "under the statute you haven't filed 
[the notice] timely." In other words, the trial 
court ruled thai Cabututan did not give notice 
"at the time of arraignment or as soon afterward 
as possible." He gave notice on January 16, 
fourteen days after the arraignment. However, 
fourteen days after the arraignment was six days 
before trial, wfajich the trial court concluded was 
too late. The court was anxious to expedite the 
four trials because all four defendants were 
being held in custody and some of the witnesses 
had left the state. 
We need not and do not here determine 
whether the trial court erred in denying 
Cabututan's motions because the denials, if 
erroneous, were harmless. At the same time that 
Cabututan moved for the appointment of a 
psychiatrist, he also moved for the appointment 
of a toxicologist "to determine the level of 
alcohol in [his] blood at the time of the alleged 
incident." That motion was granted, and a 
toxicologic was appointed. 
At the trial, Cabututan was able to testify only 
generally as to how much he had to drink on the 
fateful night. In answer to the question "How 
many drinks did you have?" Cabututan replied: 
"I don't know. [ drank what's gone out of there 
(a partially empty bottle of Jack Daniels 
whiskey) except for maybe two glasses. . . . 
You don't count how many glasses you drink, 
you know." He also testified that he drank a can 
of "Old Milwaukee's Best" and a glass of 
vodka. He described his condition as "pretty 
loaded" but said that he was not staggering and 
not like co-defendant Cayer, who he said was 
"just slobbering drunk" and "out of it." 
Cabututan further testified that he started 
drinking again the next morning, after he found 
out that Ramirez was dead. 
Following this testimony, Cabututan's counsel 
sought to have the toxicologic testify as to 
Cabututan's level of intoxication. The prosecutor 
objected on the ground that there was not a 
sufficient foundation for the toxicologic to 
express an opinion. The court sustained the 
objection, observing that Cabututan drank before 
and after the altercations with Ramirez and 
resumed drinking the next morning. It further 
observed that tome of the whiskey gone from 
the bottle was consumed by others. The court 
ruled: 
For the reauson I indicated, I don't think 
we can identify exactly how much he drank 
or over what period of time, and the critical 
thing would l>e the (amount] . . . prior to 
die incident. And so I just think there's no 
foundation on which you can base it. 
Even though the toxicologist was not permitted 
to give an opinion as to Cabututan's level of 
intoxication and how Cabututan would be 
affected by it, the trial court did give the 
following instruction to the jury on the defense 
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of voluntary intoxication: 
Voluntary intoxication shall not be a defense 
to a criminal charge unless such intoxication 
negates the exigence of the mental state 
which is an element of the offense; 
however, if recklessness or criminal 
negligence establishes an element of an 
offense and the actor is unaware of the risk 
because of voluntary intoxication, his 
unawareness is immaterial in a prosecution 
for that offense. It is the defendant's burden 
to prove that this intoxication was so great 
that he was incapable of forming the 
necessary intent. 
Cabututan has not raised as error on this 
appeal the exclusion of the lexicologist's 
testimony. However, we conclude that the 
exclusion was proper because of the lack of a 
sufficient foundation as to the amount of alcohol 
Cabututan consumed prior to the beating of 
Ramirez. A fortiori, if there was insufficient 
foundation for a lexicologist to testify, there 
would have been the same insufficiency facing 
a psychiatrist in testifying as to the effect of 
Cabututan's intoxication on his ability to form 
the requisite intent for the crimes charged. 
Therefore, assuming that defendant was entitled 
to the appointment of a psychiatrist as he 
maintains, the court's refusal to make that 
appointment was harmless error. 
PRIVATE INVESTIGATOR 
Cabututan*! second assignment of error is that 
the trial court abused its discretion in not 
entering an order for the appointment of a 
private investigator pursuant to section 
77-32-1(3) until five days before trial and that 
this delay caused his attorney to be ineffective. 
There are two problems with this argument. 
First, the belated appointment of the private 
investigator was caused by the motion's being 
filed in the wrong court; it was filed in the 
circuit court instead of the district court. 
Cabututan's attorney filed the motion on 
November 1. In a November 3 order, the circuit 
court declined to order the appointment of an 
investigator because "(tjhe required procedure 
has not been complied with." Therefore, 
Cabututan's attorney was aware two days after 
filing the motion that it was denied on the basis 
of procedural considerations. There i$ no 
evidence in the record or reference in the briefs 
to when the second motion, which resulted in 
the appointment five days before trial, was filed 
in the district court. 
Second, even though the appointment was 
belated, Cabututan'i attorney had the assistance 
of the private investigator prior to November 7, 
thirteen days after the crime occurred. Tim 
Francis, the investigator, testified at trial that he 
visited the scene of the crime on November 7. 
Defense counsel acknowledged in his closing 
arguments at trial that Francis had been at the 
scene of the crime "two or three weeks" after 
the murder. We therefore find no error in the 
belated appointment. 
JURY VIEW OF CRIME SCENE 
Cabututan next contends that the trial court 
abused its discretion in denying his motion for 
an order permitting the jury to view the scene of 
the crime pursuant to rule 17(i) of the Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure. That rule states, 
"When in the opinion of the court it is proper 
for the jury to view the place in which the 
offense is alleged to have been committed . . . 
it may order them to be conducted in a body 
under the charge of an officer to the place." The 
crime occurred near midnight, and the only 
lighting was from dim trailer lights. The only 
eyewitness who stated that Cabututan was 
involved in the major part of the fight was 
Richard Anderson, and his testimony was 
inconsistent with his prior statements and those 
of other eyewitnesses. As a result, Cabututan 
argues, if the jurors could have viewed the 
scene, they would have found (1) that 
Anderson's line of sight was obstructed by door 
frames and vehicles, and (2) that due to the dun 
light, it would have been difficult for him to see 
who was involved in the beating that took place 
outside the trailer. 
In denying the motion, the trial court based its 
decision, inter alia, on two factors: (1) the lack 
of "assurance that the conditions which now 
exist at the site are the same presently as at the 
time of the alleged incident/ and (2) "the 
availability of photographs which have 
previously been taken, diagrams of the area as 
well as maps and other exhibits and also the 
testimony of the witnesses as to the incident in 
question." The genera] rule as to granting or 
denying an order to view the premises states: 
A decision to order a viewing is within the 
discretion of the trial court. . . . A view 
should not be granted unless it appears to be 
reasonably certain or the court is satisfied 
that it will be of some aid to the jury in 
reaching its verdict and it is distinctly 
impracticable and inefficient to present the 
materia] elements to them by photographs, 
diagrams, maps, measurements, and the 
like. There is a presumption as to the 
correctness of the trial ji}dgt'$ ruling in the 
absence of a demonstration to the contrary, 
and that decision will not be upset absent a 
clear abuse of discretion. 
75 Am. JUT. 2d Trial {259 (1991); see also 
McCormick on Evidence ch. 21, §216 (John W. 
Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992); State v. Roedl, 107 
Utah 538, 155 P.2d 741 (1945). In fact, it has 
been held that a court abuses its discretion if it 
permits the jury to view the scene if the 
conditions have changed. See, e.g., People v. 
McQatfy, 86 A.D.2d 493, 495-96, 450 
N.Y.S.2d 507, 509 (App. Div. 1982) (abuse of 
discretion to see scene because of change in 
conditions); Grand Truck Western R.R. v. 
FunUy, 530 N.E.2d 139 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988) 
(new trial granted because there was no proof 
that variable of accident, such as weather 
conditions and placement of bodies, 
approximated that of actual incident). 
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We find no abuse of discretion in the trial 
court's denial of the motion to view the scene. 
At the time the motion was made, the site of the 
crime was being used by an operating business 
enterprise* It u therefore unlikely that the nte 
would have been in the same condition in 
January as it had been in October, three months 
earlier. In addition, the trial court determined 
that photographs, diagrams, and maps were 
available which were sufficient to explain to the 
jury the physical layout of the crime scene. See 
State v. Qxyer, 814 P.2d at 613, where the court 
of appeals found no abuse of discretion by the 
trial court in refusing to allow the jury hearing 
co-defendant Cayer's case to view the crime 
scene. 
JURY DELIBERATION 
On the last day of trial, the court dismissed 
the jury sometime during the morning hours "to 
return home or whatever" until 1 p.m. During 
this recess, the court and counsel prepared the 
jury instructions. When the jurors returned, the 
court instructed them, and counsel for both sides 
presented closing arguments. The record does 
not disclose when the jury was dismissed to 
begin deliberations but only that the verdict was 
returned at 8:50 p.m. that same day. 
Cabututan argues that because the jury had 
listened to four days of testimony, it could not 
have reviewed all of the testimony and evidence 
in just three hours. Thus, the jurors must have 
actually begun deliberations during the morning 
hours when many of them remained in the jury 
room waiting for court to convene at 1 p.m. 
There is no support in the record for 
defendant's assertions. When the jury was 
dismissed in the morning, the jurors were 
admonished not to discuss the case until it was 
submitted to them. We have nothing before us to 
confirm that any of the jurors remained in the 
jury room, let alone began discussing the case. 
We do not presume error; the burden is on 
defendant to demonstrate it, which he has not 
done. 
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT 
Cabututan complains of several incidents of 
prosecutorial misconduct. He asserts that 
Richard Anderson, the State's key witness, 
perjured himself and that die prosecution's use 
of his testimony violated die due process 
guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment. He 
also charges that the prosecutor commented in a 
disparaging way in elosing arguments about 
Cabututan's self-defense claims and that the 
prosecutor vouched for Anderson's credibility. 
However, Cabututan made no objections to any 
of this alleged misconduct at the time it 
occurred. Unless such objections are timely 
made, we do not consider them on appeal. "[I]t 
is the rule that if improper statements are made 
by counsel during a trial, it is the duty of 
opposing counsel to register a contemporaneous 
objection thereto so that the court may make a 
correction by proper instruction and, if the 
offense is sufficiently prejudicial, declare a 
mistrial." State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 561 
(Utah 1987). 
DENIAL OF CONTINUANCE 
rflKiftm^p contends that the trial court erred in 
denying his motion for a continuance. The 
standard of review for the denial of a motion for 
continuance u abuse of discretion: "It is 
well-established that the granting of a 
continuance is discretionary with the trial judge. 
Absent a clear abuse of that discretion, the 
decision will not be reversed by this Court." 
State v. Williams, 712 P.2d 220, 222 (Utah 
1985). Cabututan argues that when the 
continuance was not granted, he did not have 
sufficient: time to prepare his defense. The court 
appointed counsel for Cabututan on October 31, 
1989, six days after the crime occurred. Counsel 
had more than two and one-half months to 
prepare for trial. On January 10, Cabututan 
moved for a continuance. In its denial the 
following day, die trial court indicated that it 
was concerned that any further delay would 
lessen die chance that all witnesses could be 
present for the trial. This concern was 
well-founded. One of the witnesses was never 
found, and another had left the state but was 
found in Nevada prior to trial. Considering the 
circumstances in this case, we find no abuse of 
discretion in the trial court's denying the 
continuance. 
Cabututan also argues that the denial of the 
continuance rendered his counsel ineffective 
because he had insufficient time to prepare a 
defense. Denying a continuance may result in 
the violation of a defendant's Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel. In interpreting the standard set 
out in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 
104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984), we 
stated dtat when claiming ineffective assistance 
of counsel, the defendant has the burden of 
demonstrating (I) that counsers representation 
falls below an "objective standard of 
reasonableness* and (2) that any deficiency is 
prejudicial to the defendant. Suae v. Frame, 723 
P.2d 401,405 (Utah 1986). Although Cabututan 
charges several instances of conduct by his 
attorney which fell below an objective standard 
of reasonableness, he fails to show how these 
alleged deficiencies were prejudicial to him. As 
a result, we find no violation of Cabututan's 
Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of 
counsel. 
DENLtL OF MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
Cabututan next contends that the trial court 
abused its discretion in denying his motion for a 
new trial that he made on the ground of newly 
discovered evidence. He asserts that the 
testimony his three co-defendants gave at their 
subsequently held trials exculpates him and 
supports his claim of self-defense. The 
co-defendants refused to testify at Cabututan *s 
trial, invoking the protection of the Fifth 
Amendment. He argues that if a new trial is 
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granted him and the co-defendants again refuse 
to testify, a transcnpt of their testimony at their 
trials could be relied on 
At the tune of the hearing on Cabututan's 
motion for a new trial, transcripts of the other 
trials were being prepared but were not yet 
available. In arguing the motion, Cabututan's 
counsel could only generally refer to the 
testimony of the co-defendants. Counsel 
attempted to show that their testimony 
corroborated Cabututan's testimony at his own 
trial that he had acted in self-defense. 
We conclude that the tnal court was unable to 
fairly determine the merits of the motion for a 
new tnal without the availability of the 
transcnpts of the other trials. They are now 
available. We therefore reverse the order 
denying a new trial and remand the case to the 
tnal court to conduct anew the hearing on the 
motion for a new tnal 
PREJUDICE 
We decline to consider defendant's assertions 
of prejudice on the part of the jury, the court, 
and the justice system because he failed to 
provide a legal analysis of these issues 
Affirmed in part and reversed and remanded 
in part. 
WE CONCUR: 
Gordon R. Hall, Chief Justice 
1. Daniel Stewart, Justice 
Christine M Durham, Justice 
Michael D Zimmerman, Justice 
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RUSSON, Associate Presiding Judge: 
Dr. Wallace Morgan appeals the tnal court s 
amended decree of divorce, challenging the 
court's valuation and distribution of the parties' 
property and the award of alimony and attorney 
fees to Vera Morgan. We affirm. 
FACTS 
The Morgans were married June 29, 1950 In 
June 1986, Mrs. Morgan filed a complaint for 
separate maintenance. In response, Dr. Morgan 
filed an answer and counterclaim seeking a 
decree of divorce. On May 26, 1988, the tnal 
court entered a decree of divorce that (1) 
effected an extensive property distribution 
between the parties, (2) awarded Mrs. Morgan 
alimony in the amount of $2,000 per month for 
two years from the date of the entry of the 
decree, at which time alimony would decrease to 
$1,700 per month, and (3) awarded Mrs 
Morgan attorney ftts and costs in the amount of 
$75,000. 
Dr. Morgan appealed the trial court's decree 
to this court, challenging the trial court's 
valuation and distribution of the couple's 
property and claiming that the tnal court erred 
in swarding alimony, attorney fees and costs to 
Mrs. Morgan. In that appeal, this court reversed 
the trial court's award of certain costs to Mrs 
Morgan and remanded the remaining issues to 
the trial court for additional and more detailed 
findings See Morgan v. Morgan, 795 P.2d 684, 
692 (Utah App. 1990). 
On remand, following a hearing, the tnal 
court entered its amended findings of fact, 
conclusions of law and decree dividing the 
property between the parties, awarding alimony 
to Mrs. Morgan in the amount of $2,000 per 
month for two years from the date of entry of 
the decree and $1,700 per month thereafter, and 
awarding her attorney fees m the amount of 
$67,567.35.' 
Dr. Morgan appeals, claiming that the tnal 
court erred m: (1) entering findings of fact and 
conclusions of law that do not accurately reflect 
the court's minute entry; (2) valuing and 
distnbutmg the parties' property; (3) awarding 
alimony to Mrs. Morgan; and (4) awarding 
attorney fees to Mrs. Morgan. 
AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Dr. Morgan argues that the tnal court erred in 
entering sis amended findings of fact, 
conclusions of law and decree because they are 
inconsistent with the court's written minute entry 
as to the distribution of the parties' stocks. 
Specifically, he asserts that pursuant to the trial 
court's minute entry, he was awarded one 
hundred percent of the parties' stock, not 
seventy-five percent as reflected in the amended 
findings of fact, conclusions of law and decree2 
Mrs. Morgan responds that Dr. Morgan's claim 
ts moot because die tnal court, m a subsequent 
older and judgment, ordered Dr. Morgan to 
transfer twenty-five percent of the parties' stock 
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